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some courts have considered unrealized appreciation in determining
profit intent,82 it is not regarded as taxable income.83 Accordingly, it
appears that the only means by which an art collector could benefit
from this provision is by occasionally selling an art item and then
claiming in that tax year an amount for the maintenance of his collec-
tion that is not in excess of the sale price.8 4
The Wrightsman decision provides no criteria for determining the
primary purpose of the art investor beyond "consideration of all the
circumstances." As was illustrated by the principal case, art investment
can be businesslike, conscientiously pursued, and at least potentially
profitable.8 5 However, since an individual usually acquires art work
"for the purpose of realizing benefits not measurable in money, "
88
these circumstances are still not sufficient to sustain the art investor's
burden of proof. Therefore, unless there is a change in the current law,
storing art treasures from both public and private view may be the only
method by which the wealthy art investor can be certain of proving the
required primary investment purpose.
SAMUEL FRANKLIN PAINTER
PARENTAL IMMUNITY AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, 1970
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the great majority of juris-
dictions' have consistently denied an unemancipated child2 recovery
s2Cf. DuPont v. Commissioner, 234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964); Israel 0. Blake,
38 B.T.A. 1457 (1938). In a treasury memorandum issued to the congressional
committee considering this revision, it was urged that the term "profit" be defined
not only as the immediate, economic profit but as any reasonably expected long-
term increase in the value of the property. This suggestion, however, was not
adopted. Technical Memorandum of Treasury Position, (Committee Print: Ta.':
Reform Act of 1969, H.R. 13272, Sept. 30, 1969) 35, as quoted in Rhodes, Hobby
Losses-A New Challenge, 56 A.B.A.J. 893 (1976).
ssCommissioner v. First State Bank, 168 F.2d 1oo4, 1oo (5th Cir. 1948).
8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, provides that if § 183 (b) profits are made for two out
of every five years, there is a "presumption" that the activity is carried on for
profit although the "Secretary or his delegate" may establish to the contrary.
INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 183 (d). The legislative history of this provision indicates
that it is intended to replace section 270 of the old code, a provision that unsuc-
cessfully attempted to control long-term hobby losses. Rhodes, Hobby Losses-A
New Challenge, 56 A.B.A.J. 893 (1970). Owing to the legislative intent and the
considerable discretion left to the commissioner by this provision, it is doubtful that
it could be used by the art collector to prove a primary profit intent.
16The fact that the Wrightsmans were both businesslike and conscientious in their
enterprise is particularly well documented in the commissioner's opinion. Note
16 supra. By 1967, the plaintiffs had expended $8.9 million for a collection that was
later valued for insurance purposes at $i6.8 million. 428 F.2d at 1317.
80Juliet P. Hamilton, 25 B.T.A. 1317, 1320 (1932).
1Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); See, e.g., Villaret v.
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in tort against his parents. 3 Denial has rested upon the belief that per-
mitting recovery in parent-child tort suits would cause undesirable
familial disharmony.4 On the other hand, the great majority of juris-
dictions considering this question have allowed the child recovery in
tort against the parent's employer for parentally inflicted negligent in-
juries when such injuries were occasioned by the parent acting within
his scope of employment. 5 The child has been allowed to recover for in-
juries inflicted by his parent only when these injuries were business con-
nected and the employer can be held liable for his employee's actions
under the doctrine of respondent superior.6 Most courts have refused to
carve an exception out of the doctrine of respondeat superior to exempt
an employer from liability for his employee's scope of employment per-
sonal injury torts, notwithstanding the fact that the employee is per-
sonally immune from tort suit by his injured child, under the doctrine
of parental tort immunity.7
In light of the law in parental immunity and respondeat superior
cases, it is significant that in Sherby v. Weather Brothers Transfer Co.S
Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d
468 (1938); Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931); Meece v. Holland
Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E.
128 (1924); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Elias v. Collins,
237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Mannion v. Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc. 68, 129 A.
431 (1925); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Roller v. Roller,
37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
2Emancipation of a child may result from an expressed parental consent or
it may occur by operation of law. It may occur by conduct of the parent inconsistent
with the performance of bis parental obligations or by the assumption by the
infant of a status inconsistent with subjection to control by his parent. See Mesite
v. Kirchstein, io9 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Coleman v. Dublin Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 47 Ga. App. 369, 170 S.E. 549 (1933); Brandhorst v. Galloway Co., 231 Iowa
436, 1 N.V.2d 651 (1942); Taubert v. Taubert, 1o3 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908);
Lessard v. Great Falls Woolen Co., 83 N.H. 576, 145 A. 782 (1929).
-Recovery by an unemancipated minor has been denied whether the parent's
tortious conduct was intentional or unintentional. See Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md.
61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); Hastings
v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388,
77 S.W. 664 (19o3); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P- 788 (1905).
'PRossER, LAW OF ToRTS 887 (3rd ed. 1964) [hereinafter referred to as PROssER].
rCases cited notes 61 and 62 infra.
GRespondeat superior may be translated as: "Let the master answer." When an
act is done within the scope of a servant's employment or under the master's express
command, the act of the servant is considered to be the act of the master. If the
servant's act is negligent or wrongful, this conduct is imputed to the master and
he is liable in damages therefor. See Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469,
179 So. 9o8, 911 (19o8).
7See note 61 infra for states refusing to carve an exception out of the doctrine
of respondeat superior.
8421 F.2d 1243 (4 th Cir. 1970).
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the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, construing Maryland law, held
that an injured child could not recover from his father's corporate em-
ployer even though .the child's injuries were inflicted by his father who
was working within the scope of his employment. By so holding, the
Sherby court delineated an exception to the doctrine of respondeat
superior in favor of the employer.
In Sherby, the plaintiff was an unemancipated son of one of the
defendant's employees. The son, while a passenger in a company-owned
truck being driven by the father within his scope of employment, sus-
tained injuries in a collision caused by the father's negligence. The
suit by the son's next friend against the father's corporate employer
resulted in a decision in favor of the employer, holding him not laible
for the injuries inflicted by his servant. The court reasoned that:
[T]o hold that the employer is liable because of the acts of its
agent against whom no liability exists... would result in hold-
ing [the employer] liable, notwithstanding [the injured child's]
inability to have legal redress against [his father], the person
causing the injuries.
In addition, the court reasoned that the plaintiff should not be allowed
to attain recovery indirectly under respondeat superior for that which
is denied him directly by the parental immunity rule.10
The Fourth Circuit decided the case under Maryland law, accord-
ing to the Erie doctrine." The case of an employee's child suing his
father's corporate employer was one of first impression in Maryland,
so the federal court, in accord with Erie, attempted to determine how
the highest Maryland court would hold if confronted with the same
issues. The decision in favor of the employer was reached after examina-
tion of several cases dealing with closely allied areas,' 2 though no case
1421 F.2d at 1246, quoting Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.zd
99, 101 (1940).
'Old.
2uErie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie doctrine is basically a
policy statement by the United States Supreme Court to be applied in the federal
court system in diversity actions. The court stated that the law which should be
applied in matters which deal with "substantive law" will be the law of the state
where the incident giving rise to the suit actually occurred. When determining
what this law actually is, the federal court will first determine if the highest state
court has ruled on the point of law involved. If the state court has not so ruled,
the federal court will base its decision on lower state court decisions and applicable
dicta. The federal court will always try to base its holding in the diversity case
as it feels the highest state court would hold if confronted with a like fact situation.
See generally F. JAMES, CVL PROc.DuR 38-42 (1965).
22Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (denial of unemancipated
child's tort suit against parent, under Maryland law); Dennis v. Walker, 284 F.
Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968) (discussing development of parental immunity rule in
Maryland); Stokes v. Association Indep. Taxi Operators, 248 Md. 69o, 237 A.2d
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directly on point was found in Maryland decisions, and the court did
not look outside the state for other precedents.
An appreciation of the respondeat superior exception fostered by
the Sherby'3 decision can best be gained by an examination of the prin-
ciple bases upon which such a case rests, the doctrines of parental tort
immunity and respondeat superior.
The origin of the parental tort immunity doctrine is not found in
common law, 14 but is directly traceable to a trilogy of cases,' 5 Hewell-
ette v. George,1O McKelvey v. McKelvey,17 and Roller v. Roller.'8
The Hewellette case is considered the keystone of the parent-child
immunity rule and is the first American application of the defense of
parental immunity.'9 This 1891 case, cited in the Sherby dissent,20 held
that a minor daughter, married but separated from her husband and
living in her mother's home, could not maintain a suit in tort for false
imprisonment against her mother. The rationale behind the decision
was that:
[S]o long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide,
and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid
and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be main-
tained. The peace of society, and of the families composing
society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the
repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the
minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim
to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the
parent.21
The court in McKelvey v. McKelvey2 2 refused to allow a child to
sue his stepmother for "cruel and inhuman" punishment inflicted with
762 (1968) (deniel of wife's suit against her husband's employer for injuries sus-
tained while a paying customer in taxi driven by husband within scope of em-
ployment); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (court alowed recovery
against father's estate for father's intentional infliction of mental distress on child);
Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (194o) (wife denied right
to sue husband's employer for husband's negligent injury of wife within scope of
employment).
"421 F.2d 1243 (4th Cir. 1970).
14Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 15o A. go5, 9o6 (1930); McCurdy, Torts Between
Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1059-60 (1930).
"15Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 1o (Alas. 1967); Baits v. BaIts, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W,.d 66, 71 (1966).
"68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
1711 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
'p37 Wash. 342, 79 P- 788 (1905).
"See generally cases cited notes 61 and 62 infra.
0421 F.2d 1243, 1247 (4th Cir. 1970) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
"Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 887 (189q) (emphasis added).
nii Tenn. 388,77 S.W. 664 (1903).
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the father's consent. This case cited Hewellette with favor and closed
with a statement that parental immunity from tort action was a "well-
settled rule controlling the relation of father and child."28
The Roller sUit,24 a rather extreme example of a court proclaim-
ing parental immunity, concerned a father's rape of his daughter.
Though the father had been convicted of the rape and was incarcerated
as a result thereof, the court refused the daughter the right to sue her
father in tort. The court, in explaining its strict application of the
doctrine, wrote:
[I]f it be once established that a child has a right to sue a parent
for a tort, there is no practical line of demarkation [sic] which
can be drawn, for the same principle which would allow action
in the case of a heinous crime ... would allow an action to be
brought for any other tort.25
The parental immunity doctrine is based on the judicial belief that
family peace, harmony, and parental disciplinary authority should
take precedence over a child's recovery from his parents for their torti-
ous actions. 26 There has been a balancing of the detriment to family
peace and harmony caused by a child being able to sue his parent in
tort against the benefits to be gained by the child "from the continu-
ance of the parent-child relationship unhampered by the possible shat-
tering effect of adversary civil litigation in which damages for per-
sonal injury are sought."27 The scales tip toward the contentment of
the home and away from the child's redress against his parent.
28
In spite of the widespread judicial disfavor of tort actions between
unemancipated children and their parents, 29 the years since the 195o
Roller decision 3o have seen numerous instances in which courts of
many jurisdictions have firmly established an unemancipated child's
right to sue his parent in tort.81 From the time of the statement of the
077 S.W. at 665.
2'37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (195o).
'79 P. at 789.
26See, e.g., Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 7o3, 9 So. 885 (1891); Gaudreau v.
Gaudreau, io6 N.H. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352,
15o A- 9o5 (1930).
'Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67, 68 (Okla. 1964).
2E.g., Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12, 16 (1923).
2Cases cited note i supra.
037 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1o5).
31
See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Buttrum v. Butt-
rum, 98 Ga. App. 226, 1o5 S.E.2d 510 (1958); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 6o8, 131
N.E.2d 525 (1956); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 15o A. 905 (193o); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445
(1950); Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
CASE COMMENTS
parental immunity rule, quoted in the 1891 Hewellette case, 32 to the
present, the "exceptions . . . have almost swallowed the rule."33 Ex-
ceptions have been made where the parent's tortious activity arose in
the conduct of his business, 34 where the parent-child relationship has
been manifestly abandoned,3 5 and where liability insurance has been
held to abrogate the family peace and harmony basis of the doctrine. 36
Numerous courts have permitted an unemancipated child to sue
his father for injuries which the child sustained as a result of the par-
ent's business negligence.37 These courts "distinguish between claims
arising out of negligence of the parent in the discharge of parental
duties and the negligence of the parent in connection with the conduct
of his business or employment." 38 For instance, recovery has been al-
lowed in an action by an unemancipated child against his father for
personal injuries sustained when the father, while operating his busi-
ness vehicle for business reasons, ran over the child.39 The court allowed
recovery because it considered the "relationship between the two at the
time of [the] accident was not parent and child, but driver and pedes-
train. ' 40 The judicial feeling is that, when a parent is engaged in his
business, he owes the same duty to his child that he owes to any other
member of the community. 41
Parent-unemancipated child tort suits have been permitted where
"Note 21 and accompanying text.
3Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 722, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 40
(1961) (Fuld, J., dissenting).
"Trevarton v. Trevarton, - Colo. -, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84
N.H. 352, 15o A. 905 (1930); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 1o3 N.E.2d 743 (1952);
Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 243,
251 P.2d 149 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W'.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (932). See generally
Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823, 835 (1956).
3See Buttrum v. Buttrum, 98 Ga. App. 226, 105 S.E.2d 510 (1958); Emery v.
Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131
N.E.2d 525 (1956); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966);
Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (950).
3Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W.Ad 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere, 1o7 N.H. 432, 224, A.2d 588 (1966); Dunlap v. Dun-
lap, 84 N.H. 352, 15o A. 905 (1930); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d
192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939);
Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122
N.W.2d 193 (1963).
'Cases cited note 34 supra.
3'Trevarton v. Trevarton, - Colo. - 378 P.2d 640, 642 (1963).
'Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
4°0251 P.2d at 157.
41See generally Trevarton v. Trevarton, - Colo. -, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Dunlap
v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 15o A. 9o5 (1930); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, l03 N.E.2d
743 (1952); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Borst v. Borst, 41
Wash. 2d 243, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
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the tortious action of the parent is deemed willful or wanton 4 2 The
actions typically show that the parent has manifestly abandoned the
parent-child relationship. Where, for instance, the parent's drunkenness
causes an automobile accident which injures the child, the child has
been allowed recovery. 43 Recovery has also been granted for mental in-
juries intentionally inflicted by a father upon his infant daughter.4 '
The fact situation shows that the father had totally disregarded his
duty as a parent. In holding in favor of the daughter, the court stated:
On its face, the rule [of parental immunity] is a harsh one....
The father who brutally assaults his son or outrages his daugh-
ter ought not to be heard to plead his parenthood and the peace
of the home as an answer to an action seeking compensation for
the wrong.. . . Outside that relation [of parent and child], the
rules are inapplicable; and any attempt to apply them leads to
irrational and unjust results.45
An increasingly common circumstance where parent-unemancipated
child tort suits have been permitted is that where liability insurance is
held to negate the underlying arguments in favor of parental immun-
ity.4 6 Courts have traditionally held that insurance does not create
liability where none exists in the absence of such insurance,4 7 but
there is a recent tendency for courts to take notice of insurance as a
fact of life which should not be disregarded in parent-child tort suits.
4 8
While the judicial reliance upon the existence of liability insurance is
not confined to cases within the last decade,49 it is significant to con-
sider the recent holdings of five jurisdictions.
4Cases cited note 35 supra.
"See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406
P.2d 323 (1965).
"Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). This decision has been in-
terpreted by the Sherby court as "a narrow exception" to the parental immunity rule.
Sherby v. Weather Bros. Transfer Co., 421 F.2d 1243, 1245 (4th Cir. 1970).
077 A.2d at 925, quoting Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 15o A. go5, 9o9 (1930).
"8Cases cited note 36 supra. Note that five of the eight cases have been decided
since 1963.
47See, e.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Owens v. Auto Mut.
Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d
468 (1938); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Siembab v. Siembab,
2o2 Misc. 1o53, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 284 App. Div.
652, 134 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1954); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
"Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere, io7 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Goller v. White,
20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
"See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 15o A. 9o5 (193o); Worrell v. Worrell, 174
Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
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Since 1963, five states50 while permitting parent-child tort suits, have
totally abrogated parental immunity or have emasculated its effect.51
The suits in all jurisdictions involve negligent vehicular accidents
caused by an insured family-member driver. A significant basis upon
which these jurisdictions rest their holdings is the belief that the exis-
tence of liability insurance tends to negate any possible disruption of
family harmony and parental discipline. 52 The belief is that the parent-
child litigation is, in reality, between the injured party and the negli-
gent driver's insurance company.53 The suit is, therefore, not between
parent and child, and there is only a remote possibility of any un-
pleasantness which would tend to disrupt the family unit. One court,
in spite of the fact that it determined that the plaintiff was not allowed
to recover from the defendant's insurer, wrote:
[W]e consider the wide prevalence of liability insurance in per-
sonal injury actions a proper element to be considered in making
the policy decision of whether to abrogate parental immunity in
negligence actions.1 4
The fact that five states have recently permitted parent-unemanci-
pated child tort suits where liability insurance was involved implies
judicial hostility toward parental immunity. More importantly, these
decisions, all handed down since 1963, show that there is a definite
trend toward liberalization in parent-unemancipated child tort suits.
The plaintiff in Sherby based his argument for allowance of recovery
against the employer on the existence of this trend toward liberaliza-
tion.6 The Sherby court, however, was not persuaded that, in light of
the trend, "there is no logical reason to deny a child the right to sue
the father's employer for injuries incurred by reason of the father's
WOCases cited note 48 supra.
n"Wisconsin was the first state to abrogate parent-child immunity. The state
stopped short of total abrogation by continuing immunity in circumstances
(i) [W]here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of paren-
tal authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent
act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect
to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental serv-
ices, and other care.
Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963). Both New Hampshire
and Minnesota totally abrogated parent-child immunity in 1966. Baits v. Baits, 273
Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere, 197 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
Alaska, in 1967, appears to have totally abolished parent-child immunity. Hebel v.
Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967). New York, in 1969, surpassed the other four states by
totally abolishing any and all forms of intra-familial immunity. Gelbman v. Gelb-
man, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
"Cases cited note 48 supra.
WId.
"Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
5 42 1 F.2d 1243, 1246 (4th Cir. 197o).
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negligence while engaged in his regular employment and within its
scope."56 The apparent leaning of Maryland's highest court was inter-
preted by the Fourth Circuit as being against the plaintiff's argument.57
The trend permitting tort suits between an unemancipated child
and his parent began only in the middle of the last decade. 58 However,
the trend in respondeat superior suits between an injured child and
his father's corporate employer for injuries inflicted by the father
while acting within the scope of his employment dates back to 193o.59
The decisions have been decidedly in favor of the injured children,
notwithstanding the Sherby decision. 60
Of the sixteen jurisdictions which have ruled on the employer's
liability to his employee's child, eleven have held in favor of the plain-
tiff.61 Only five, including Maryland, by implication in Sherby, have
held for the defendant-employer. 62 In these sixteen jurisdictions, nearly
all the cases have involved injuries sustained as a result of negligent
vehicular accidents.63 These accidents have generally caused injury to
the child in one of two ways, either by the child being struck by the em-
ployer's vehide 64 or by the child being injured while a passenger in the
vehicle during its collision with another vehicle. 65 Regardless of the
MId. at 1246-47.
5mSee generally cases cited note 12 supra.
58Goller v. White, 2o Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
"Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., iii Conn. 377, 150 A. 107 (93o).
"See cases cited notes 61 and 62 infra.
"The eleven states indicating that the child may recover are: Alabama, Con-
necticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsyl-
vania, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala.
469, 179 So. 908 (1938); Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., iii Conn. 377,
i5o A. 107 (1930); Stapleton v. Stapleton, 85 Ga. App. 728, 70 S.E.2d 156 (1952);
O'Connor v. Benson Coal Co., 3o Mass. 145, 16 N.E.2d 636 (1938); Radelicki v.
Travis, 39 N.J. Super. 263, 12o A.2d 774 (1956); Sullivan v. Christiensen, 191 N.Y.S.2d
625 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 5o3, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948); Koontz v.
Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 A. 792 (1935); Littleton v. Jordan, 428 S.W.2d 472 (rex. Civ.
App. 1968); Smith v. Smith, ii6 W.Va. 23o, 179 S.E. 812 (1935); Le Sage v. Le Sage,
224 Wis. 57, 271 N.W. 369 (1937).
"The five states holding in favor of the employer are: California, Illinois,
Maryland, Nebraska, and Tennessee. Sherby v. Weather Bros. Transfer Co., 421 F.2d
1243 (4 th Cir. 1970) (construing Maryland law); Myers v. Tranquility Irrig. Dist.,
26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (D. Ct. App. 1938); Meece v. Holland Furnace Co.,
269 Ill. App. 164 (1933); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959); Graham
v Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945).
03See generally cases cited notes 61 and 62 supra.
"Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 15o A. 107 (1930);
Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 261 Ill. App. 164 (1933); O'Connor v. Benson Coal
Co., 3o Mass. 145, 6 N.E.2d 636 (1938); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d
16 (1959); Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945).
"Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938); Myers v.
Tranquility Irrig. Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (1938); Stapleton v. Staple-
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precise manner in which the accident occurred, the basis of recovery
in all cases where the employer is sued is respondeat superior.66
The basis of an employer's defense in a respondeat superior suit
by his servant's child is generally reduced to that of relying on one or
a combination of the following contentions. First, since the child is
precluded by the parental immunity rule from suing his parent as a
matter of public policy, 7 the master cannot be made to answer in
damages for an injury which did not give rise to liability in the servant.
The master's liability is derivative of, or dependent upon, that of his
servant. Second, the granting of recovery to the child would lead to
family disharmony because of the employer's rights under indemnifica-
tion to secure recovery from his tortious employee-parent. 6s
Courts tend to treat as analogous respondeat superior cases involving
suits by an injured child against his father's employer and an injured
wife against her husband's employer.69 Those which deem it necessary
to grant or deny recovery to an injured child are inclined to rely upon a
prior decision which has held that a wife may or may not sue her hus-
band's employer.7 0 This judicial tendency is constant, almost without
exception.
7 1
Sherby is in line with this tendency, as evidenced by the wife-em-
ployer case cited by the court as being closest to its fact situation.
Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co.,72 relied upon as controlling in the
Sherby decision,73 held that an employer was not liable to his em-
ployee's wife for personal injuries inflicted by the employee-husband
within his scope of employment. The Riegger court, in line with the
employer's contentions, stated that it considered liability and not culp-
ton, 85 Ga. App. 728, 70 S.E.2d 156 (1952); Schomber v. Tait, 207 Misc. 328, 140
N.Y.S.2d 746 (955); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948); Le Sage
v. Le Sage, 224 Wis. 57, 271 N.W. 369 (1937).
OSee, e.g., Myers v. Tranquility Irrig. Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419
(1938); Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., ii Conn. 377, i5o A. 107 (1930).
67Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
"Cases cited notes 61 and 62 supra.
"Compare Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42
(1928) and Garnto v. Henson, 88 Ga. App. 320, 76 S.E.2d 636 (1953) with Sullivan v.
Christiensen, 191 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1959) and Stapleton v. Stapleton, 85 Ga.
App. 728, 70 S.E.2d 156 (1952).
OId.
,'Illinois appears as a significant exception in that it denies a child the right to
recover from its father's employer, but permits a wife to recover from the employer.
Compare Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933) with Tallios v.
Tallios, 345 Ill. App. 387, 1o3 N.E.2d 5o7 (1952).
72178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (194o).
3421 F.2d 1243, 1246 (4th Cir. 1970) .
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ability to be the true basis of the doctrine of respondeat superior.
7 4
The employee-husband is immune from tort liability to his wife, in
spite of his culpable actions, and, accordingly, it is illogical to hold the
employer liable for acts of the agent who escapes liability.
The possibility of employer indemnification is a further basis used
to support non-liability. In Myers v. Tranquility Irrigation District
7 5
factually similar to Sherby, the court denied recovery from the em-
ployer, basing its decision on the belief that a judgment against the em-
ployer would finally be paid by the parent because of the employer's
right of indemnification. The Myers court felt that since the family
harmony argument bars suit by the child against his parent, the same
argument should bar suit by the son against the father's employer. The
fact that the father could be forced to indemnify his employer would
cause family discord and would tend to cause a breakdown in parental
discipline.76
Courts holding that an employer is liable to his employee's child
typically hold that the employer's liability to the injured child is pri-
mary and is not based upon his employee's liability or immunity there-
from.77 These courts hold that the agency maxim of "he who acts
through another acts by himself" is paramount when determining an
employer's liability.7 8 It is the employee's responsibility for the negli-
gent injuries to his child for which the employer must answer in dam-
ages.7 9
The servant has committed a tort which by ordinary rules of law
should make the master liable, and there is no reason to include
the latter within the purely personal immunity of the family.80
The employer's assertion that his right of indemnification against his
tortfeasor-employee will lead to family disharmony by circumventing
7,Contra, PROSSER at 890. Dean Prosser states that such an argument "confuses
immunity from suit with lack of responsibility."
1126 Cal. 2d 385, 70 P.2d 419 (1938).
7 0f little persuasive value in combatting this argument is Professor Prosser's
statement that the
master's recovery over against the servant is not based upon any
continuation of the original domestic claim, but upon the servant's
independent duty of care for the protection of the master's in-
terests....
PROSSER at 89o. The technical distinction mentioned here does not alleviate the fact
that the parent has been forced to pay indirectly damages to his injured child.
17Cases cited note 61 supra.
78d.
10See PROSSER at 890.
"OPROssER at 89o.
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parental immunity might be countered merely by a judicial denial of
indemnity.81
The Sherby court did not specifically reject the arguments presented
by either Professor Prosser or the Restatement (Second) of Agency, both
of which militate in favor of the plaintiff in a suit by a child against
his father's employer. Prosser has termed decisions such as that in
Sherby as the "almost entirely obsolete" view of vicarious liability,82
and he has stated that the overwhelming majority of courts now hold
the employer liable even though the employee is immune from suit. 3
Buttressing Prosser's observations is the view espoused by the Restate-
ment8 4 which states that in a respondent superior suit, the principal
has no defense because of the fact that the agent has an immunity from
civil liability.8 5
In light of the Erie doctrine, the holding in Sherby is tenable. s6
With the significant exception of Mahnke v. Moore,8 7 an extreme
factual situation,88 the Court of Appeals of Maryland has been con-
sistent in its espousal of the doctrine of parental tort immunity.8 9 The
Sherby court chose to rely heavily on the Riegger case because of its
close analogy to the Sherby fact situation, and the 1968 Maryland
Court of Appeals' reaffirmance of Riegger.90 The Fourth Circuit has,
thus, preserved Maryland's position as a stalwart supporter of the em-
ployer's non-liability under this narrow case of vicarious liability.
ftid.
8Id.
'"Id.
"In an action against a principal based on the conduct of a servant in the
course of employment ... [t]he principal has no defense because of the fact that...
the agent had an immunity from civil liability as to the act.
RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 (b)(ii) (1958).
'Chief Judge Cardozo wrote, of the employer's lack of immunity defense, that
"the employer may not hide behind the skirts of the employee's immunity." Schu-
bert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42, 43 (1928).
""The holding is tenable when examined in light of Professor Wright's state-
ment:
In vicariously creating the law for a state, the federal court may
look to such sources as the Restatements of Law, treatises and law
review commentary, and "the majority rule." The federal court
must keep in mind, however, that its function is not to choose the
rule that it would adopt for itself, if free to do so, but to choose the
rule that it believes the state court, from all that is known about its
methods of reaching decisions, is likely in the future to adopt.
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 240 (2d ed. 197o).
s7197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1940).
89A father murdered his common-law wife within the sight of their infant
daughter. The father later committed suicide in front of his daughter after forcing
the child to remain in the same room with the mother's decaying body for a week.
6'See generally cases cited note 12 supra.
'5Stokes v. Association Indep. Taxi Operators, 248 Md. 690, 237 A.2d 762 (1968).
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